Jean-François Jacques (U. Gustave Eiffel), joint with Basak Bayramoglu (PSAE INRAE) and Klaus Eisenack (Humboldt Universität)
This paper investigates global cooperation by considering the growing role of cities alongside national governments in addressing climate change. Recognizing the disparity between negotiated emission reduction targets and actual mitigation efforts, the study employs a game-theoretical model featuring two countries and two cities. It explores how the interplay between self-interested national and local governments influences cooperative behaviour and emission reduction outcomes. The findings reveal that cities consistently fail to meet their individual climate targets, regardless of their participation in transnational municipal networks (TMNs). Their decision to join such networks hinges on the stringency of national emission reduction targets. Cities only join TMNs if national targets are sufficiently low, prompting them to set more ambitious local targets. Both mitigation efforts and local targets are then strategic substitutes with respect to the national target. When countries pursue non-cooperative strategies, conditions emerge where cities opt to join the network, making the countries’ targets strategic substitutes. Overall, this study contributes to understanding avenues for enhancing global climate cooperation by leveraging the participation of diverse actors beyond national governments.